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Abstract. Mobile platforms enable third-parties to extend and enhance func-
tionalities of products and services by mediating these to consumers. A tremen-
dously successful example is Apple’s App Store where third-party developers 
contribute applications that add to the usefulness of the mobile device. Howev-
er, research and practice still struggle with understanding why and when such 
mobile platforms prosper or wither. In this paper, we develop a framework to 
study how companies use governance mechanisms to attract customers and 
third-party developers. We demonstrate the usefulness of our framework by an-
alyzing how governance mechanisms were used to change the interaction of 
platform, customers, and third-party developers. We derive six principles for 
governing mobile platforms that highlight the need to further investigate how 
governance mechanisms align the value propositions to platform operator, cus-
tomers and third-party developers. 
Keywords: mobile platforms, governance, controls, services 
1 Introduction 
Enabling third-party developers to add functionalities to a core product by providing a 
mediating mobile platform is an increasingly popular model to raise earnings and 
enhance customer satisfaction [1-3]. Mobile platforms are also known as App Stores 
providing a development and marketplace environment.  
However, many companies struggle to provide a sustainable and thriving mediat-
ing platform. This challenge is illustrated by the fact that 97 percent of the mobile 
services market share is held by only seven platforms, despite the fact that 40 to 50 
platforms exist [4]. As platforms are affected by network effects, the success of a 
platform is determined by having enough participants on the development side to 
attract the customer side and vice versa. These stakeholder interests need to be 
aligned by governance [5-6]. 
The struggle with platform success in practice highlights the complexity of mobile 
platform governance and reflects the immaturity of practical understanding and re-
search on platform governance [7-9]. In particular, we observe that in practice plat-






concept [10]. Yet, imitation ignores the fact that platform governance needs to fit to 
the ecosystem of the platform which is never identical across platforms [4], [11].  
In this paper, we triangulate results from heterogeneous background - a previous 
literature review, a basic governance concept for platforms and real world example - 
to posit initial principles for using governance to align the value propositions for plat-
form operator, customers, and third-party developers. We thereby contribute to re-
search on the important topic of mobile platforms by developing a theoretical frame-
work that helps to study how companies use governance mechanisms to become at-
tractive to customers and third-party developers. The usefulness of our framework 
will be demonstrated by analyzing how governance mechanisms were used to change 
the interaction of platform customers and third-party providers. In conclusion, we 
derive six principles for governing mobile platforms that highlight the need to further 
investigate how governance mechanisms align stakeholder interests. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we discuss the literature 
on platform governance identified in the literature review of Manner et al. [8]. Based 
upon this, we adapt the basic concept of platform governance proposed by Manner et 
al. [8] to provide a practically applicable platform governance framework to study and 
classify the use of governance mechanisms in the mobile platforms of Apple, Google 
and Microsoft. We compile evidence from the field with literature to propose initial 
principles for using governance mechanisms to align the value propositions to plat-
form provider, customers and third-party developers. Finally, we discuss our findings 
and conclude with an outlook on future research opportunities. 
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 A Definition of Mobile Platform Governance 
In this paper, we focus on mobile platforms such as Apple’s App Store with two-
market sides: the developer environment and the buying environment. Mobile plat-
forms like Apple’s App Store are socio-economic layered, consisting of an IT-based 
artifact which enables external knowledge holders to contribute functionality to a core 
product [7], [12]. In this way, platform providers are mediating the process of adding 
functionality to the IT-based marketplace and therefore to the consumers to gain fur-
ther economic value; for example, by extracting revenue from transaction and to 
achieve their strategic aim.  
Aside from platform providers, there are two major stakeholders to be considered 
in a platform ecosystem: developers and consumers. They are part of the definition of 
platform ecosystems as a functional unit consisting of the platform provider, develop-
ers, consumers as well as strategic partners of the platform provider [13-14]. The 
integration of third-party developers into the value creating process is a challenging 
concept. A platform provider needs to establish regulating guidelines, documentations 
and rules to enable and guide developers which assist them in creating compatible 
applications to extend the core product [9]. On the one hand, developers need support 






the other hand, the platform provider must maintain control and prevent developers to 
bypass the platform, building a direct developer consumer relationship. Thereby, pro-
viders lose their possibility to integrate their strategic aims like a specific customer 
experience and gaining money from the platform [13], [16]. 
The regulating framework to shape a viable and sustainable platform is known as 
platform governance. It provides structures to manage the stakeholder relationships 
[17], determines the allocation and distribution of power for actions [18] and controls 
the actions of the platform stakeholders [19]. Hence, platform governance is defined 
as “the structure, power, processes, and control mechanisms that are applied by the 
platform owner to achieve his aims” [8]. 
2.2 Theories Related to Mobile Platform Governance  
The key element to a viable platform is the balance of its ecosystem by sound plat-
form governance [7], [11], [20]. It is a multi-dimensional concept that links the tech-
nical architecture of a platform with the ecosystem, and the platform provider’s pow-
er. Hence, studying mobile platforms demands the investigation of technical, organi-
zational and financial aspects [21].  
Since the concept of platform governance touches many different disciplines, the 
existing knowledge of governance is very fragmented [7], [10]. Many researchers in 
the fields of economics, strategic management and organizational science have exam-
ined aspects of platform governance corresponding to their discipline [8], [11]. Infor-
mation systems research now combines some of this fragmented work originating 
from its reference disciplines [8], [22]. 
Economics was one of the first research disciplines to study the underlying concept 
of platforms: pricing in two- and multi-sided markets [5-6]. They discuss pricing 
mechanisms for platforms and price elasticity in the competitive ecosystem of dynam-
ic systems [6], [17], [23]. Still, research in this field provides little managerial impli-
cations for platform providers and governance [7]. Strategic management literature 
regards the role of platforms as complementary markets [3], [24], starting a broad 
discussion about “how open is open enough” [25], observing the field in a practical 
way and explaining the past [14], but not providing process implications for practi-
tioners. Organizational science literature addresses platform governance from a con-
trol perspective [26]. Controls are considered a powerful instrument to synchronize 
activities [27] and to “assure ongoing alignment between their investment in the 
community and related product goals” [28]. 
Across all streams of literature, there is consensus that successful platform govern-
ance fits to the ecosystem of a platform and thus cannot be easily imitated [7], [9]. 
Hence, actively developing distinct platform governance mechanisms that fit to the 
platform ecosystem might be a solution [7]. Yet, a comprehensive understanding of 






3 A Comprehensive View on Mobile Platform Governance  
In this chapter, we discuss the elements of platform governance derived from litera-
ture and their links to each other, building a comprehensive view on mobile platform 
governance based on the findings of Manner et al. [8]. Figure 1 illustrates the three 
levels of the platform governance framework. The top level is the market structure, 
the second level is the governance policies and the bottom level is the governance 
configuration. Taking this perspective, we begin to elaborate on the elements of gov-
ernance and its implications. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Top level governance framework [8]  
3.1 Market Structure 
The value propositions of a platform depend on the congruence of the platform with a 
dynamic market structure [4], [11]. The discipline of marketing defines the market 
structure as the macro-ecosystem of the platform [29]. Thus, a fit between platform 
governance and the ecosystem is vital for platform success [7]. As an example, soft-
ware providers “are constantly evolving, increasing their depth and/or reach and in the 
process redefining their boundaries”, which stresses the importance of ecosystem 
alignment [1], [30]. Following a similar line of arguments, de Reuver et al. [31] sug-
gest important triggers that describe a dynamic market structure, such as the emer-
gence of new technologies, regulatory changes, or competitive changes from chang-
ing consumer behavior or behavior of competitors. These dynamics in the market 
structure require to constantly realign the value propositions of platform operators, 
customers, and third-party developers [2], [6]. Consolidating literature on classical 
market structures [29] and electronic markets [32], we condense the following trig-
gers of a market structure for mobile platforms. These triggers constitute important 
cues to the platform operator when formulating the objectives and the strategy along 
with the business model [32]: Legal triggers describe events originating from legisla-
tion, government agencies, or jurisprudence that affect the platform, e.g., restrictions 
to access user data [8]. Technical triggers originate from technical progress, e.g. the 
increasing availability of fourth generation broadband Internet access. Also pre-
commercial developments have to be taken into account as they may have significant 
impact on the design of a platform [4], [16]. Socio-economic triggers refer to eco-
nomic events and actions that also influence social reality, for example the increasing 
awareness for privacy issues in society [4], [7], [32]. Competitive triggers originate 






strategic moves of competitors that shift competition advantages between market 
actors [7], [19]. Stakeholder triggers refer to actions of customers, third-party devel-
opers or other strategic partners of the platform operator. To give an example, devel-
opers who are disgruntled by poor technical support, might switch to competing plat-
forms. Changes in customer behavior are also important triggers [11], [21], [31]. 
3.2 Governance Policies 
The next task is the transition from ecosystem to governance, which is a sub form of 
the market structure [33]. This is achieved by the formulation of policies. We define 
policies as an organizing logic which is derived from the market structure. Heading 
up, we assessed the basement of literature identified by Manner et al. [8]. Thereby, we 
observed a variety of issues which lead to seven policy sections. These aim at resolv-
ing particular questions.  
Standardization policy: To what extent shall the platform be standardized? This 
implies a trade-off, considering that a too high degree of standardization means poor 
usability for developers but assures flexibility to adapt to ecosystem changes [18]. 
The interaction between different functionalities can be supported by standardization 
which can deliver an added value by complementary use. However, innovation can be 
hampered. Ensuring usability is a further trade-off for platform providers. Ease of use 
is supported by a uniform interaction design but it demands high and expensive con-
trol efforts. These rules aim at aligning features, services and platform experience. 
Providing a new API or SDK sets a standard as well as implementing a new section 
within a marketplace. 
Incentive policy: How are the platform stakeholders incentivized, especially de-
velopers? Users as well as developers need to adapt to the platform. It is not well 
known what really motivates developers to develop for a certain platform. According 
to Holzner et al. [15], financial aspects, prestige and creative freedom are important 
incentives for developers. Providing creative freedom contradicts to the user’s de-
mand of ease of use and compatibility of functionality. The design of the incentive 
policy must therefore be balanced with the standardization policy. Many other exam-
ples exist. Yet, they pose interdependencies to other policies [7], [15]. Incentives can 
be either positive like new incentive programs or negative when a previously imple-
mented incentive is withdrawn by the provider. 
Legal policy: Who is allowed to use, change, transfer and benefit from the plat-
form and its facilities? Property rights for apps could remain with the developer, but 
could also be transferred to the provider. This issue may be addressed – for example – 
by shared income and licenses [19]. With increasing access to the core product by 
applications of third-parties, new legal issues arise. 
Quality of Service policy: Which quality of service is offered to the customer? 
Quality is an important aspect for platforms regulated by governance [33]. This topic 
addresses issues of functionality, availability, performance and perceived service 
quality from the viewpoint of service consumers [21], [34]. 
Distribution policy: How are services, support and tools distributed by the plat-






er satisfaction and service usability. Developers have to be provided with the latest 
SDK and processes for application integration have to be implemented [19]. In gen-
eral, the whole value network from developer to service consumer is covered. There 
are also different ways to enable customers to access the offering. For instance, An-
droid customers can choose between several distribution platforms, but Apple cus-
tomers must use Apple’s App Store or install illegal software applications like Cydia 
[12], [34]. 
Finance policy: How is revenue generated and how are the financial aspects orga-
nized on the platform? More important is the share of profit between the platform 
stakeholders [21]. Customers need to pay reasonable prices for their added functional-
ities. Developers need to make stimulating profits or they will not continue develop-
ing for the platform. A platform provider needs to skim enough off the platform reve-
nue streams to be able to continue offering and nurturing the platform. Detailed as-
pects are the right to set prices on applications, discretization of prices and entry fees 
for developers [18-19], [21]. 
Security policy: What security standards have to be implemented? This refers to 
data, communication and distribution security, access to personal user data and simi-
lar aspects [16], [18-19]. The platform provider decides what APIs are offered and 
thereby which access the third-party applications are allowed to the device. The more 
APIs are offered, the more functionality can be built. On the downside, possibilities 
for security gaps that need to be controlled increase in number. The security policy 
also ensures the authentication process and determines the authorization of third-party 
applications and users.  
The goal is to align policies perfectly to the market structure [7], [35]. The five core 
papers on platform governance, identified by Manner et al. [8] revert to more than 
twenty different aspects, which have to be resolved in a platform context. These all 
can be categorized into the above mentioned policies. Based on literature, we believe 
that a main challenge on this governance level is to find the correct fit between these 
policies [7]. For example, the more technical support (quality of service policy) is 
provided to the developers, the more skilled they get. Thus, the platform provider can 
grant skilled developers a higher degree of design clearance, which stimulates them 
positively (incentive policy). But a too high degree could infringe the platform, when 
allowing too much access to programming interfaces and other means of the standard-
ization policy. The implementation of low admittance criteria for developers to foster 
immigration (incentive policy) is another aspect. But to keep the desired quality-of-
service, one has to adapt the technical support to the needs of unskilled developers. 
All interdependencies are of a varying nature and must be analyzed in the specific 
context. The policies defined here provide view of issues every platform has to con-
sider. 
3.3 Governance Configuration 
The constituted governance policies must be implemented to manage consumer expe-
rience and to align with stakeholder objectives [20]. Platform operators need to 






ernance policies [16]. Every mechanism can be described from a governance perspec-
tive as well as from a control perspective [7], [18]. 
De Reuver and Bouwman [18] classify governance mechanisms into three not-
mutually exclusive categories: Authority-based governance mechanisms employ 
the platform provider’s power to enforce behavior as desired using policies. Con-
tract-based governance mechanisms refer to legally binding agreements, whereas 
trust-based governance mechanisms are based on the assumption that the target 
group has strong incentives to reach the desired goal and levers these incentives [18]. 
Control mechanisms inform the platform operator about the extent to which the 
governance mechanisms are effective and efficient. Originally, Ouchi [36] defined 
three different types of control mechanism: outcome, behavior and social control. 
They all aim at achieving coordination between parties with different intentions and 
goals in organizations. Kirsch [37] expanded social control through self-control. 
Thereby, she distinguishes between group and individual level. Cardinal et al. [38] 
adds input control where meeting desired inputs such as employee skills to an objec-
tive are appreciated. However, we differentiate the following control mechanisms: 
Input control mechanisms define required characteristics of provided input, e.g. 
developers and apps. Meeting these characteristics is rewarded. An output control 
mechanism sets a desired output. Again, reaching such goals is rewarded. Behavior 
control provides procedures and routines to reach a goal, where compliance with the 
procedures and routines is rewarded. Social control mechanisms strengthen common 
values and shared beliefs. People acting according to these are rewarded by social 
acceptance to the system. Such a control is implemented by rewarding behavior that 
has a “substantially overlap” with the interests of the subject under control [36], e.g. 
developers that code in a certain style are rewarded by thorough feedback on their 
code. 
Output and behavior control are formal mechanisms, whereas input and social con-
trol are informal mechanisms. According to previous findings, control is implemented 
by a mixture of control mechanisms [36-37]. Applying the right balance of each con-
trol mode is essential [39]. 
3.4 A Framework for Mobile Platform Governance 
We have three levels to consider when designing a platform governance concept. The 
first level is the market structure giving an overview of the platform’s current situa-
tion which is influenced by legal, technical, socio-economic, competition and stake-
holder behavior aspects. Changes to these imply an adaption of the present govern-







Table 1. Governance Framework: Important elements and corresponding levels. 
  Level Aspects 
Market 
Structure 
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Mechanisms Input Outcome Behavior Social    
 
On the second level, governance policies are derived to implement the business strat-
egy in conformance with the market structure and to achieve corresponding goals. At 
the bottom layer, governance mechanisms implement the policies from a means point 
of view, focusing on its characteristics, whereas controls focus on targets, mainly 
specific stakeholders and their behavior. Table 1 aggregates the critical issues of plat-
form governance into a morphological framework. 
4 Insights from Changes in Governance Concepts 
In order to understand the effectiveness of governance concepts, we analyzed three 
governance changes from different platform providers: Apple, Android, and Mi-
crosoft. The goal of the multiple change analysis was to find out, if the framework is 
applicable for governance change analysis and findings on how successful platforms 
are governed. Apple’s App Store and Google’s Google Play mobile platforms have 
often been described in research as completely different (closed vs. open). Therefore, 
they are suitable platforms to gain insights. We also chose the Windows Phone Store 
in contrast to the two mobile platform leaders Apple and Google [34]. At present, 
Microsoft battles with establishing a developer and consumer base rather than base 
extension. The chosen cases are suitable to demonstrate the framework applicability 
and to provide further insights as they provide a wide variety.  
4.1 Governance Changes in the Apple Platform 
Earlier this year, Apple made a significant privacy change. This was triggered by a 
broad discussion in politics and society overall (socio-economic and stakeholder 
behavior trigger) about the unauthorized extraction of personal data like the address 
book by application providers. Apple may have feared that the discussion could start 
to unsettle users and make them more reluctant to buy applications. Then, the attrac-
tiveness of the platform for users would have additionally suffered.  
In consequence, Apple used its power as platform provider and applied an adapted 
security policy prohibiting unauthorized access via applications without prior asking 
for access to secure the trust of its mobile device customers. 
To enforce the security policy Apple changed from a contract-based governance 






thority-based governance. Previously, although it was forbidden to access the data, it 
was not controlled, whether the application recorded data without permission. This 
means it was social control (informal). The new control consists of a mixture of 
input and behavior control. The implemented input control mechanisms are a 
change in the SDK and the release of a new operating system (authority-based), 
whereas contracts remained as behavioral control steering the developers behavior 
(contract-based) [40]. In this real world change, we find two principles applied. It 
presents a formal input control supported by an informal behavioral control presenting 
a control mix. Since Apple aimed to limit uncertainty by generating new trust of 
users in Apple who otherwise would have left the platform, we also find high mecha-
nism strength that is proactively implemented, as there was no lawsuit or law at the 
moment of change.  
4.2 Governance Changes in the Android Platform 
The second example analyzes Google’s change of their platform governance concept 
regarding the Android billing system. Google had installed a contract-based mecha-
nism controlled by social control to make developers use Google’s in-app billing 
system for in-app purchases. However, Google recognized that more and more devel-
opers circumvent Google’s in-app billing system. 
Due to this fact, consumers were confronted with different billing systems, which 
negatively influenced their experience and Google’s revenue. This omitting behavior 
of the developers as stakeholders triggered a governance change. Android changed 
the approval process regarding in-app billing. Google established its own billing sys-
tem, implementing an authority-based governance mechanism via an adapted stand-
ardization policy. This policy change is controlled by an adapted approval process. 
The approval process, as a form of output control, now rejects any applications in-
fringing this rule [41]. We identify that governance changes trigger control changes in 
the same direction. More strict governance leads to a formal strict control. Therefore, 
we derive a congruency between governance and control. 
4.3 Governance Changes in the Windows Platform 
The last case deals about the Windows Phone Store. Being a new entrant with al-
ready two major competitors like Android and Apple, Windows needed to catch up 
with the amount of application offerings. Only few developers worked for Windows 
Phone due to the lack of advantages they saw in providing their applications for 
Microsofts’ small consumer base [15]. Microsoft needed to establish a relationship to 
potential application developers to gain a certain amount of developers providing 
innovative and various applications to also attract consumers.  
Hence, trust-based governance in the form of a new incentive policy for devel-
opers was introduced. By providing free phones for developers, promising visibility 
of their apps as well as advance payment, money and prestige was given as incentive. 
From a control perspective, Microsoft also implemented an informal social control. 






opers’ interests and its Windows Phone Store [36], [42]. In this real word example, 
we observe two principles. Firstly, the Windows Phone platform implemented proac-
tively the incentive policy to achieve more participants. Secondly, the governance and 
control mechanisms were implemented congruently as a light governance mechanism 
is supported by a light informal control.  
5 Six Principles for Governing Mobile Platforms  
Principles for governing mobile platforms have not yet been suggested in literature. 
We therefore propose to derive principles for governing mobile platforms based on 
our framework, evaluated literature and real world examples of governance changes. 
The suggested principles are reflected between these sources and identified in at least 
two of them to achieve more robust results [43].They are summarized in Table 2. 
We argued that all three governance levels (market structure, governance policies 
and the governance configuration) are important. Each governance level sheds light 
on different aspects that need to be considered when deriving platform governance. 
Thus, we propose “consider every governance level” as the first governance principle. 
The next topic to be considered is the dynamic nature of the ecosystem of the plat-
form. To be viable, platform owners need to quickly react to changes in the ecosystem 
[7]. This requires an ongoing evaluation and anticipation of changes and their impacts 
to the market structure. Platforms should constantly adapt their governance and learn 
from these changes. Our second governance principal is therefore: “Use proactivity to 
ensure viability”. 
The direct link between the market structure and the governance policies implies 
the need to align both levels. We argue that mechanisms are the means to enforce 
policies. Thus, changing policies always trigger a subsequent change in the govern-
ance configuration. Therefore, we propose the third and the fourth governance princi-
ple “Adapt policies to changes in the market structure” and “Constantly align govern-
ance and control mechanisms”. 
Platform providers differentiate primary and secondary objectives, e.g. being prof-
itable or establishing a large user base [2], [15]. Primary objectives need to be en-
forced by authority-based governance and formal control to ensure their pursuit. Sec-
ondary objectives are mainly supported by trust-based and informal control. Thus, our 
fifth governance principle is: “Enforce primary objectives through authority-based 
governance and formal control”. Yet, control modes are implemented by a mixture of 
controls, where formal controls are the main part, aided by informal instantiations 
[37]. Applying the right fraction of each is essential. Our sixth governance principle is 






Table 2. Six principles for governing mobile platforms from a provider’s perspective 
# Princi-
ple 










Platform providers should think through 
all three governance levels to structure 
their governance decision process and 
evaluate the impact of the change. 
Governance can be divided into three abstract and 
interdependent levels. All of them have to be consid-
ered when implementing governance as each has 











Anticipate changes in the ecosystem to 
be ahead of your competitors and thus 
ensure competitive advantage and 
success.  
Governance is about the alignment with the ecosys-











Governance policies need to be aligned 
with the market structure to guarantee 
the correct implementation of govern-
ance and control mechanisms 
Governance policies contain implementation guide-
lines. Implementing the right strategy is vital for 
platform success. Thus, the correct alignment of 
market structure and policies is a precondition to 











Governance and control mechanisms 
have to be aligned with the policies to 
ensure correct implementation of the 
strategic aims 
Governance and control mechanisms are the means 
through which the platform provider takes action. 
After formulating the correct strategy in the policies, 
its manifestation in tangible mechanisms is essential 













 When pursuing a primary business 
objective, providers should only use 
authority-based governance and formal 
control (and no other means) 
Platform providers need to meet primary goals to be 
successful. Mechanisms which ensure the fulfillment 
of the goals are necessary. Relying on trust and good 









 Formal controls to ensure primary 
objectives should be aided by informal 
controls. 
Primary goals should not be enforced by informal 
controls as they are essential and fulfillment should 
not be exposed to uncertainty. Consequently, formal 
controls are required. To ensure that primary goals 
are reached, further aid is necessary to limit uncer-
tainty by adding extra informal controls. 
RW, L 
*Source: L - Literature on platform governance; FW - Governance framework; RW - Real-world Examples 
6 Discussion 
Research on platform governance is fragmented [7], [9]. As many companies fail in 
providing a thriving platform by aligning stakeholder interests in real world, we argue 
that platform governance research could advance understanding of why some mobile 
platforms prosper and others wither. Although research on platforms and governance 
is increasing, there are little empirical insights on this complex concept to this point. 
When a complex phenomenon is studied, a triangulation of sources is especially ap-
propriate since it contributes to the robustness of results and a more complete under-
standing [43]. Therefore, we combined insights from literature qualitatively, reflect-
ing these on a previously developed framework and deriving insight from real world 
examples. 
We adapted a basic mobile platform governance concept provided by Manner et al. 
[8]. Unlike its predecessor, the framework combines the elements together and 
provides classification characteristics within each level making it applicable for real 
word governance change analysis. The final framework structures platform govern-
ance into three distinct levels, the market structure, governance policies and the gov-






level, enabling platform providers to structure their decision. Moreover, we analyzed 
three real world governance changes demonstrating the applicability and usefulness of 
the framework to analyze and understand governance. 
To support the framework with guidance, we proposed six principles for governing 
mobile platforms which are based on literature findings, elements of our framework 
and three real world governance changes. Each principle was derived from at least 
two of these three sources. Hence, we claim to have proposed robust findings. 
The first principle complete use was found in literature, derived from the frame-
work and within each real word example as we were able to fully apply the frame-
work. In fact, we could also find the proactivity principle proposed by literature as it 
is reflected in all presented governance changes. Every store actively initiated a 
change without being forced by for example law or bankruptcy. 
The third principle of congruency I between market influence factor and the gov-
ernance policy is validated by the fact that a market influence factor triggering the 
governance policy change was identified within each change. The fourth principle 
congruency II, which proposes the alignment between governance and control, is 
reflected by the Windows Phone Store change where the implementation of a light 
governance mechanism is supported by a light informal control. The counterexample 
is provided by Google Play presenting the implementation of strict governance that 
leads to a formal strict control which in the end results in a high validity of this prin-
ciple. Ensuring the enforcement with mechanisms is especially important when busi-
ness interests are depending. Apple’s interest not to lose trust of market participants 
was undeniably strong. Analyzing the change and detecting strong mechanisms sup-
ports and validates the literature derived principle of mechanism strength on the con-
dition of business objectives. At last, literature is proposing that control mechanisms 
do not occur mutually exclusive. Evidence on our proposed principle of control mix 
was also found in reality where an input as well as behavioral control was applied by 
Apple’s App Store. 
Altogether, we were able to supply reliable verification for each principle. Fur-
thermore, the principles were reflected and rationally analyzed to provide quality 
control. Our real world examples clearly support the claim that governance needs to 
be designed carefully. A fitting governance concept can only be designed for one 
certain platform, not for several and even such a concept does only fit until it needs to 
be adapted to the ecosystem again [7], [9], [11].  
Our findings propose the first support for platform providers to develop govern-
ance rather than imitate as the framework proposes a structured way to analyze gov-
ernance changes and enables to identify more easily what consequences a change 
could cause. Hence, it enables a well-structured decision. As the principles were de-
rived from the three big players in the mobile service market, they will help practi-
tioners to provide a thriving platform when combined with the presented framework. 
However, to this point the framework and the principles do not support the develop-
ment of governance for a new platform or advise what governance policies should be 
adapted on the platform when for example a new competitor enters the market. More-
over, at the moment, the principles are of general nature that need to be analyzed 






world considered by practitioners that are not yet implemented in the framework and 
the principles derived from literature.  
We acknowledge several limitations of our work. First of all, our framework is for 
the most part based on a literature review provided by Manner et al. [8]. Furthermore, 
although our examples provide a wide range as we chose three different platforms to 
prove the applicability of the framework, more changes should be looked at. Finally, 
our examples only observe changes from a secondary source. Interviews with the 
platform providers questioning their motives could provide more insights  
7 Conclusion and Future Research 
We analyzed the literature, proposed applicable mobile platform governance frame-
work and applied the framework to analyze multiple governance change examples. 
Six principles for governing mobile platforms were derived from the framework, real 
world and literature insights.  
Providing such a structured view on the multi-dimensional concept of governance 
based on research findings of several disciplines, builds a more mature view on plat-
form governance and is a valuable contribution to research and practice.  
However, we believe future empirical research could enlarge the proposed mecha-
nisms. For example, we believe a legal factor, triggering changes, has to be integrated 
by contract- or authority-based governance mechanisms as well as by formal controls 
rather than by trust-based mechanisms and informal controls. As shown in the exam-
ples, governance policies can be ignored by stakeholders if not enforced by the right 
tangible mechanisms. Implementing weak governance, although a legal framework 
does exist, is to others an opportunity for a lawsuit claim. 
A cross-case study analyzing a large amount of governance changes would be an 
adequate method for finally evaluating the framework and enlarging the governance 
principles. Interviews with platform providers would contribute to this research and 
enable to build a platform theory [43]. 
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